Constitutional Law by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 37 





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(1985) "Constitutional Law," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 37 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol37/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. USE OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS FOR INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Byrd v. County of Florence' the South Carolina Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional the use of general obligation
bonds2 by a political subdivision for industrial development
when the principal and interest for the bonds were to be paid
from ad valorem taxes.3 The court held that the development of
an industrial park was not a public purpose for which general
obligation debt could be incurred under the South Carolina
Constitution.4
Florence County Council passed an ordinance authorizing
the sale of general obligation bonds to allow the county to
purchase a 575 acre tract in the western part of Florence
County. The ordinance provided that the tract would be used to
develop an industrial park that would be sold or leased to pri-
vate industry, thus providing additional jobs and improving the
economic base of the county. 5 The debt service and principal of
the general obligation bonds were to be repaid over a period of
years from proceeds derived from ad valorem taxes imposed on
Florence County property owners.
"Public purpose" is not specifically defined by statute, but
is a judicial construct subject to judicial determination. Courts
have never specifically defined public purpose as contrasted with
1. 281 S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d 804 (1984).
2. The North American Securities Administration Association Glossary of Securi-
ties Terms (date not provided) defines a general obligation bond as a tax-exempt bond
whose pledge is the issuer's good faith and full taxing power. The glossary distinguishes a
general obligation bond from an industrial revenue bond, which is defined as a municipal
bond issued for the purpose of constructing facilities for profit-making corporations. The
corporation, rather than the municipality, is liable for the payment of the interest and
the principal.
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979). An ad valorem tax is a tax imposed
on the value of property.
4. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14(4) provides that "general obligation debt may be incurred
only for a purpose which is a public purpose and which is a corporate purpose of the
applicable political subdivision."
5. Florence, S.C., County Council Ordinance No. 14-82/83 at 5.
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private purpose, but have employed a case by case approach.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has stated that public pur-
pose is a fluid concept, influenced by circumstances such as
time, place, population, and economy.7 The court has also estab-
lished that the objective of a public purpose is to promote public
health and welfare.8 More than a remote public benefit is re-
quired to fulfill a public purpose.9 In Byrd the court stated that
"[a]ll bonds, whether general obligation or revenue, must meet
the demands of the Constitution that a public purpose be
served."' 0 Building an industrial park as an incentive to attract
industry did not meet the public purpose requirements.
The Byrd court based its decision on the following three
grounds: the speculative nature of the project, the liability to the
taxpayers, and the indirect benefit to the public. The speculative
nature of the project was demonstrated by the trial record,
which stated that "the industries to be located in the park are
unknown and indefinite, and no commitments or contracts by
any industry to locate within the park have been made."-" The
supreme court concluded that the nature of the project was too
speculative since the purchaser or tenant for space in the park
was not identified.12 The court noted that a county council "is
constitutionally limited to borrowing money for a clearly demon-
strated nonspeculative public purpose."' 3
In addressing the liability to the taxpayers of Florence
County, the court admitted that it generally approved of indus-
trial revenue bonds for purposes characterized as economic or
industrial development, as it had in Elliott v. McNair.14 The
court distinguished Byrd from Elliott by explaining that Byrd
involved general obligation bonds under which "taxpayers may
6. Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
7. Caldwell v. McMillan, 224 S.C. at 158, 77 S.E.2d at 801 (1953).
8. 265 S.C. at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 47.
9. Id. at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 48.
10. 281 S.C. at 404, 315 S.E.2d at 805.
11. Record at 4.
12. 281 S.C. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 805.
13. Id.
14. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967). In Elliott the court upheld the constitution-
ality of using industrial revenue bonds because the bonds were payable from the revenue
of the project and the county was protected from pecuniary involvement. In Elliott the
county purchased property to lease to private industry for a price sufficient to meet the
debt on the revenue bonds.
[Vol. 37
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lose much," rather than industrial revenue bonds under which
"taxpayers cannot lose."
15
The third reason articulated by the court was that article X,
section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution, proscribes pledg-
ing or loaning public credit to benefit private enterprise. The
court reasoned that the primary beneficiaries of the proposed
development would be private businesses, which would be
spared "analysis cost, costs of roads, sewer, water and electricity
facilities."' 6
To summarize its rationale in Byrd, the court set forth a
four-part test to determine public purpose. First, the court
should consider the project's intended public benefit. Second,
the court should examine whether the public is the primary ben-
eficiary. Third, the court should consider whether the project is
speculative. Finally, the court must determine to what extent
the public interest will be served.17 The court did not include in
the test the source of repayment of the bonds, which it had spe-
cifically emphasized as a relevant and logical consideration 8 in
defining public purposes.
In the dissent Justice Ness argued that there were four rea-
sons for classifying the development of an industrial park as a
public purpose. The first reason was that the court had previ-
ously approved of counties "acquiring, leasing and disposing of
properties" for industrial development in Elliott v. McNair.9
15. 281 S.C. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 805.
16. Id. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 807. After Byrd, the supreme court held in Carll v. S.C.
Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438, 327 S.E.2d 331 (1985) that the South Carolina
Jobs-Economic Development Fund Act (1983 S.C. Acts 379, No. 145) was not violative of
art. X, §11 of the S.C. Constitution even though the purpose of the act was to provide
loans, investments, research, and technical and managerial advice to industry locating in
the state. S.C. CODE ANN. §41-43-70 (Supp. 1984). The court stated: "The limitation im-
posed upon the power of the General Assembly by Article X, §11 of the South Carolina
Constitution 'relates solely to general obligation bonds payable from the proceeds of ad
valorem tax levies.'" 284 S.C. at 443-44, 327 S.E.2d at 335, (quoting Elliott v. McNair,
250 S.C. 75, 85, 156 S.E.2d 421, 426).
17. Id., 315 S.E.2d at 806.
18. Id. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 805.
19. Id. at 410, 315 S.E.2d at 808. Elliott provided:
The Act [Industrial Revenue Bond Act] here under consideration recites that
South Carolina has promoted industrial expansion and has actively supported
the State Development Board, for which public moneys have been appropri-
ated, and through it has endeavored to promote the industrial development of
the state for the welfare of its inhabitants. This has been done as a matter of
state policy. It is the purpose of this Act to empower the governing bodies of
19851
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Justice Ness found Byrd to be inconsistent with the court's prior
definition of public purpose.
Second, the dissent rejected the majority's reasoning that
private industry, rather than the public, would be the primary
beneficiaries of the project.20 The dissent reasoned that the ex-
perience of other industrial parks in South Carolina and other
states indicated that this investment would pay for itself
through the creation of new tax dollars and jobs and would thus
strengthen the local economy.2
The dissent also discussed the purpose of the Florence
County Ordinance-the development and encouragement of in-
dustry-and noted that this purpose was similar to that of the
State Development Board.22 Justice Ness contended that if the
ordinance was unconstitutional because of its "indirect" benefit
to the public, the State Development Board's actions were like-
wise unconstitutional.
23
The dissent's final argument focused on the South Carolina
Home Rule Act,24 which authorizes county governments to levy
ad valorem taxes for economic development. The dissent sug-
gested that Florence County could have financed the industrial
park by ad valorem taxes, but chose instead to pass the cost of
developing the industrial park to industries that bought or
leased the property. Justice Ness stated that there was no differ-
ence in the degree of speculation in the bonds issuance proposed
by Florence County and that of the General Assembly's appro-
priation of money to the State Development Board.25
The Byrd decision may be either narrowly or broadly con-
strued. Under a narrow reading, the decision would affect only
the several counties of the state under the terms and conditions of this Act,
to provide such assistance and to that end to acquire, own, lease and dispose
of properties, through which the industrial development of the state will be
promoted ....
250 S.C. at 87, 156 S.E.2d at 427 (emphasis added). In the dissent Justice Ness asserted
that the project in Byrd was identical to that in Elliott. Id. at 408, 315 S.E.2d at 807.
20. 281 S.C. at 411, 315 S.E.2d at 808-09.
21. Id. at 409, 315 S.E.2d at 807.
22. Id., 315 S.E.2d at 807-08. The purpose of the State Development Board is "[t]o
promote and encourage industrial development, private business and commercial enter-
prise . . . ." S.C. CODE ANN. § 13-3-20(6)(1976).
23. 281 S.C. at 409, 315 S.E.2d at 807-08.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30(5)(1976).
25. Id. at 409, 315 S.E.2d at 808.
[Vol. 37
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the purchase and development of industrial parks to be sold or
leased to private industry through general obligation bonds
rather than industrial revenue bonds. Byrd prohibits political
subdivisions from purchasing and developing property to be sold
or leased to private industry if the political subdivision is unsure
that industry will buy or lease the property 6 and the liability for
the project rests on the taxpayer- Under this interpretation,
"public purpose" is described in terms of risk to the taxpayer.
Therefore, the Byrd decision would apply only to general obliga-
tion bonds because, unlike industrial revenue bonds, they in-
volve a risk to the taxpayer. The Elliott court's definition of
public purpose27 can be reconciled with Byrd's only if a distinc-
tion is made between the use of industrial revenue bonds and of
general obligation bonds.
A broad interpretation of Byrd would require application of
the four-part test to general obligation bonds, industrial revenue
bonds, and other public funds used to purchase and develop
property to be sold or leased to industry. If Byrd is interpreted
broadly, questions regarding the extent to which government
may spend public money for industrial development remain un-
answered. The dissent's concern with the State Development
Board's use of public funds to promote industrial development
and the authority of a county under the Home Rule Act to use
ad valorem taxes for economic development raises serious ques-
tions.28 Because industrial development is of vital concern to the
26. Byrd suggests that the speculative nature of a project depends on the reliability
of industry commitments prior to the issuance of the bonds. The majority believed the
Florence County project was too speculative because neither a purchaser nor a tenant
could be identified. Although Justice Ness stated that two industries were "considering"
locating in the Florence area, there was no assurance of this fact. 281 S.C. at 409, 315
S.E.2d at 807.
27. Whether a project primarily benefits the public, rather than private individuals,
is a question of degree. The court has stated that "[l]egislation does not have to benefit
all of the people in order to serve a public purpose. At the same time legislation is not
for a private purpose as contrasted with a public purpose merely because some individ-
ual makes a profit as a result of the enactment." Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 163,
217 S.E.2d 43, 47 (1975). In Anderson the court held that a city project for slum clear-
ance in preparation for sale to private developers was not for a public purpose and was,
thus, unconstitutional. The project was financed by revenue bonds. The court found the
benefit to the public "indirect."
28. Immediately after the Byrd decision, the Judiciary Committee of the South Car-
olina Senate introduced S.995, 105th Sess. (1984), proposing a constitutional amendment
allowing the state and its political subdivisions to "incur general obligation debt for the
19851
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economy, employment, and tax base of South Carolina, the Gen-
eral Assembly should address the questions raised by Byrd and
decide to what extent general obligation bonds may be used to
encourage and promote industrial development. The determina-
tion of this issue is particularly significant because the Deficit
Reduction Act of 19842e places a volume cap on the amount of
industrial revenue bonds that can be issued in the state.30 Be-
cause of this cap, the state may have to rely more on general
obligation bonds to promote its economy in the future.
Inez Moore Tenenbaum
II. SOUTH CAROLINA TEACHER EMPLOYMENT ACT: No DUE
PROCESS HEARING FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASSIGNMENT
In Snipes v. McAndrew31 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a public school principal has no property inter-
est in the position of principal and no right to a due process
hearing under the South Carolina Teacher Employment and
Dismissal Act 32 (TEDA) when he is "merely transferred, reas-
signed or demoted."' 3 The court found that a school district's
administrative reassignment does not constitute a dismissal
under the employment contract and does not raise a constitu-
purpose of promoting economic and industrial development ... including ... the es-
tablishment and maintenance of industrial parks." The bill passed the senate, but was
not received by the South Carolina House of Representatives in time to be considered in
the 1984 session. During the 1985 session a similar bill, S.304, 106th Sess. (1985), was
introduced by the Senate Finance Committee, passed by the senate, and referred to the
Ways and Means Committee of the house of representatives, where it remained at the
close of the session.
29. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
30. The Act imposes a limit on the maximum principal amount of industrial revenue
bonds (also called industrial development bonds) that may be issued within a geographi-
cal area. The volume cap is set on a statewide basis at $150 per resident per year ($100
in 1986). Pub. L. 98-369 § 621.
31. 280 S.C. 320, 313 S.E.2d 294 (1984).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-25-410 to -530 (1976 & Supp. 1984). The Act requires the
school district to decide whether teachers' employment contracts will be renewed for the
coming year and to give them written notification of the decision on or before April 15. A
teacher who will not be reemployed must be given the same notice and opportunity for a
hearing that is provided for a teacher dismissed for cause during the school year. Id. at
§§ 59.25-410 to -420.
33. 280 S.C. at 324, 313 S.E.2d at 296.
6
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tional right to a due process hearing. The court expressly re-
fused to tamper with the school district's delegated authority
34
over administrative policy decisions of employee placement
within the school district.3
Snipes and Shaw were principals in Richland County School
District One.36 In March 1981 McAndrew, the Superintendent of
Richland County School District One, notified Shaw by letter
that his leadership as a principal was inadequate and conse-
quently, he would be reassigned to a classroom teaching position
for the 1981-82 school year.3 7 On April 9, 1981, the School Board
notified Snipes that he was to be reassigned as assistant princi-
pal for the 1981-82 school year. Counsel for both Shaw and
Snipes requested a hearing before the Richland County School
Board concerning their clients' terminations as principals. The
Board replied that Shaw's and Snipes' reassignments39 were
merely administrative and, therefore, not covered by the
TEDA.4 ° Subsequently, each man's counsel was permitted to ap-
34. The legislature has specifically empowered a school district's board of trustees to
make employment decisions:
On or before April fifteenth of each year, the boards of trustees of the
several school districts shall decide and notify, in writing, the teachers, as de-
fined in § 59-1-130 of the 1976 Code, in their employ concerning their employ-
ment for the ensuing year ....
On or before August fifteenth the superintendent, principal, where appli-
cable, or supervisor shall notify the teacher of his tentative assignment for the
ensuing school year.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-410 (Supp. 1984).
35. 280 S.C. at 323, 313 S.E.2d at 296.
36. Shaw was principal of John P. Thomas Elementary School for 15 years and
Snipes was principal of Alcorn Middle School for 10 years. Both were issued identical
contracts for the 1980-81 school year, under which they accepted the duties of a princi-
pal for a period of 220 days. Record at 176-79. Each contract was a standard Contract for
Certified Personnel issued by Richland County School District One. Id. at 213, 218, 220,
221, 232.
37. Record at 223-24. The letter did not indicate that Shaw's reassignment was
prompted by a failure to meet any of his yearly goals, established in Fall 1980. See infra
note 44. Instead, the reasons cited were poor leadership and an unacceptable achieve-
ment rate by students at John P. Thomas Elementary School.
38. Id. at 216, 219. McAndrew had notified the school board in February 1981 that
Snipes' leadership qualities were inadequate: he had failed to monitor the teaching and
manage the physical plant properly. McAndrew's subsequent memorandum of April 9
cited the same grounds for Snipes' reassignment.
39. The new contracts for the 1981-82 school year stipulated that Shaw be employed
as a teacher for 185 days and that Snipes be employed as an assistant principal for 220
days. Id. at 218, 232.
40. Id. at 219, 227.
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pear before the Board on May 11, 1981, but no due process hear-
ing was permitted in either case.4' The Board declined to direct
the Superintendent to rescind the administrative reassignments.
Respondents filed actions in the circuit court and obtained
a temporary order enjoining the appellants from filling all prin-
cipal positions in the District, thus preserving at least two va-
cant principalships pending a hearing on the merits.42 The chief
justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court superseded this or-
der upon condition that the respondents be maintained
pendente lite in the salary status of their previous positions.43
After a full hearing the circuit judge made the following conclu-
sions: (1) the administrative reassignment was a nonrenewal of
their contracts for the position of principal; (2) the school dis-
trict did not properly or promptly notify respondents of their
nonrenewals in accordance with the TEDA or the Principal
Evaluation System (PES);44 and (3) the respondents held a legit-
imate property interest in their positions as principals of which
they could not be deprived without a due process hearing.45 Ac-
cordingly, the circuit court ordered the respondents reinstated
as principals.46
On appeal the supreme court reversed the circuit court. The
court first noted that the term "teacher" as defined in the
TEDA includes both administrative or supervisory personnel
41. Id. at 179. The basic requisites of a due process hearing under the TEDA, such
as presentation of witnesses, cross examination, taking of depositions, and other normal
adversarial hearing procedures, were denied the respondents. Id. at 171-73, 183.
42. 280 S.C. at 322, 313 S.E.2d at 295-96.
43. Id., 313 S.E.2d at 296. The effect of the new contracts would have been to re-
duce Snipes' salary by $11,915.00 and Shaw's salary by $6,248.00 from the 1980-81 levels.
The school district, however, agreed to freeze the respondents' salaries at the 1980-81
levels until the salaries of their new positions reached the levels of their 1980-81 salaries.
44. Under the PES, principals, in conjunction with an assistant superintendent, es-
tablished goals and time limits pursuant to the Principal's Professional Growth Plan..
The principals were then to be evaluated on their success or failure in meeting these
goals over a three-year period. A principal could appeal to the assistant superintendent
for instructions when a disagreement arose concerning the iesults of any evaluation. Any
principal who did not show a marked improvement in performance would not be re-
newed as a principal. The principal then would have the right to appeal the nonrenewal
decision pursuant to the PES. Record at 199-202. Respondents, however, both received
letters from assistant superintendents stating that they were to be evaluated for a period
of one year and would be expected to set goals for the upcoming year. Record at 214,
222.
45. Record at 185-86.
46. 280 S.C. at 322, 313 S.E.2d at 296.
[Vol. 37
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and teachers.47 Since, however, the express language of the
TEDA refers only to dismissal or nonrenewal, and not to trans-
fer, reassignment, or demotion, the court concluded that the Act
does not apply to the school district's policy decisions concern-
ing the assignment of employees.48 The court also stated that
because the PES was not operative during the relevant school
year, 1980-81, its "right to appeal" provision did not afford re-
spondents due process rights.49 Finally, the supreme court re-
jected the trial court's finding that the TEDA created and de-
fined a property interest"0 for the respondents in their continued
employment as principals.51 Instead, the court held that while
the Act created a claim of entitlement to continued employment
within the school system as a teacher, which by definition in-
cludes both administrative and nonadministrative positions,
52 it
47. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-1-130 (1976) defines "teacher" as "any person who is
employed either full-time or part-time by any school district either to teach or to super-
vise teaching."
48. 280 S.C. at 322, 313 S.E.2d at 296. See Adams v. Clarendon County School Dist.
No. 2, 270 S.C. 266, 272, 241 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1978)(court noted that the TEDA was
"designed to afford the teacher safeguards against arbitrary discharge from employment
while at the same time recognizing the public's legitimate interest in quality education"
(emphasis added)). Two other states, Indiana and Arkansas, have had teacher dismissal
acts that, like South Carolina's, address the dismissal and nonrenewal of contracts, but
not transfer or demotion. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 20-6-121-1, -2 (Burns 1975); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§§ 80-1264 to -1264.10 (1980)(repealed 1983). Both acts were interpreted as requiring
procedural due process only in cases of dismissal or nonrenewal, not for transfer within
the school system. See New Castle-Henry Township School Corp. v. Hurst, 145 Ind. App.
131, 247 N.E.2d 835 (1969); Smith v. West Memphis School Dist., 635 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.
1980).
49. 280 S.C. at 324, 313 S.E.2d at 297. The court relied on testimony given at trial
by two assistant superintendents that only the goal setting portion of the PES was
operative.
50. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), in which the United States
Supreme Court rejected the respondent's claim that he had been deprived of a property
interest without due process of law. Respondent Roth was hired for a one-year (1968-69)
teaching position at the University of Wisconsin. During the school year he was informed
he would not be hired for the 1969-70 term. Because the respondent was given no rea-
sons for not being rehired and was afforded no opportunity to challenge the decision at a
hearing, he brought an action alleging violation of his right to procedural due process.
The Supreme Court held that Roth had no property interest in his position that required
the university to give him a hearing. The fourteenth amendment procedural protection
of property protects only acquired security of specific benefits. Wisconsin statutory law
never granted Roth a right to be rehired, and his abstract concern in being rehired was
insufficient to trigger due process protection. Id. at 577.
51. 280 S.C. at 324, 313 S.E.2d at 297.
52. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
9
et al.: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1985
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REvmw
did not create a property interest in continued employment as a
principal.
5 3
Snipes v. McAndrew firmly established the ability of school
boards to reassign personnel without being burdened with the
expense of providing a full adversarial hearing for each reassign-
ment. To hold otherwise would create administrative chaos and
entangle school boards in needless arbitration and litigation. A
school system must shift personnel each year as exigencies arise;
allowing extensive due process battles over each shift could chin
school board decision making. Although the result in Snipes
may appear harsh, school boards must remain free of judicial
restraints that would burden, rather than enhance, a school dis-
trict's operations.
Richard K. Warther
53. 280 S.C. at 324, 313 S.E.2d at 297. Thus, a principal's property interest and the
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